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No. 70-130 
U. S. v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education 
No. 70-187 
Cotton v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education 
Cert to CA 4: WK}CRXI!IW Ha§Znsworth, Borernan, Bryan, Crav~; dissenting: 
Sobeloff, Wintm;: 
This case and its companion, No. 70-188, Wright v. Council 
of the City of Emporia, involve attempts Ek by Eix~x cities in 
black majority EI!INRX}C counties to separate from the county 
school district and to form their own. In both cases, district 
court judges enjoined the XN secession. iRXEI!IXRXEHXRX¥XHilliR 
~*xix CA 4, sitting en bane, considered both cases together, 
along with a third case which is not before the Court, and 
reversed the district courts. This court granted cert. Because 
CONTROLLING CASES: Green v. School Board of New Kent Counf,y, 
391 u.s. 430(1968);swann v. Charlotte-Mecklgnburg Board_Qf_ 
Education, 402 u.s. 1 (1971). 
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of the ximi similarity of the legal issues, I intend to discuss 
the case law first, before dealing with the factual situation 
1 
~ in both cases. 
A-l·~ : In 1968, the states that had a segregated school system 
-~).,-~ad still made virtually no real steps to comply wi~h their 
l~~~ gmNxx Constitutional duties to desegregate. Rxee«xm Freedom 
~ of choice was the system under which most school districts 
were organized. The Court «ex dealtR with freedom of choice 
in the case of Green v. School~oard of New Kent County, 391 
U.S. 430 (1968), in a unanimous opinion written by Justice 
Brennan. That case established that the school boards where 
de jure segregation existed had an affirmative duty to deseg~te 
those schools. The Court used the strongest language: 
"It is incumbent upon the school board to establish 
that its proposed plan promises meaningful and immediate 
progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation. 
It is incumbent upon the district court to weight that 
claim in light of the facts at hand and in ligh~ of any 
alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more 
promising in their effectiveness. Where the g court 
finds the board to be acting in good faith and the pro-
~ed plan to have real ~xmx~e«x prospects for dismantling 
the state-imposed x dual system at the'earlie~practable 
date,' then the plan may be said to provide effective 
relief. Of cousse, the availability m to the board of 
other more promising courses of action may indicate a 
lack of good fxx faith; and at the least it places a 
heavy burden upon the board to explain its preference 
for an apparently less effective method." 
The present cases arose under this mandate in Green. But they 
were decided in both the district and Rix~xi circuit courts 
before the Court indicated, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), exactly how serious it 
was. 
Swann, RRmiocR another unanimous opinion, this time written 
by the Chief Justice, attempted to express the breadth of 
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discretion which a district court had in enforcing the duty 
of school boards to dismantle the dual system, It was held 
that there was no substantive right that requires every school 
in a community to reflect the racial composition of the school . j ~ 
system as a whole. But the Court did hold that mathematical ~ 
~ -
~s should be used as a starting point in the process of 
shaping a remedy. ~ Less than perfect balance was permissible 
impractical 
if fR such an achievement proved to be/im~~xxiBie. It is clear, 
however, that the kxiRx Court's definition of impractical was 
a stringent one. For in Swann, the Court approved such drastic 
steps as rearranging school disrticts and attendance zones as 
well as massive bussing in order to achieve the racial balance 
needed to break up dual systemso 
From these two pronouncements, I draw the following conclusions: 
School boards have an immediate duty to eradicate all traces 
of the dual system. District Courts RR have the responsibility 
of supervising kxx this process. In performing that function, 
the district courts are granted enormous equitable discretion. 
xxxxxxXkexex~~xxexx~~x~xx~xxeexx~xxxxxkRx Because of the 
pervasive nature of the dual system over patterns of living, 
the courts must often E~~xe compel massive changes. '~ile 
they are not required to achieve racial balance, they must 
attempt to come as close to it as the limits of practicality 
allow. 
I have spelled out what is probably obvmous to xe~m someone 
who has been involved in these cases, only because I think the 
Ni court of appeals has approached the problems before it in 
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a way that ignored this history (some of which had not been 
made at them time.) Instead of examining the problem to 
see MRKXKXR whether the plans involved BERXKXH~xxkex carne as 
close to achieving a racial balance in the school systems is 
as was possible within the bounds of practicality, CA 4 
approached the problem like it was a normal equal protection 
problem. The analysis it MHRxxx went XRfil through was similar 
':~ to analysis of the eq~l protection argument made in the 
Texas welfare case heard last week. ike CA 4 treated the 
school systems involved as if they were located in a state that 
had never engaged in de jure segregationo Had Nfilxxkxg the 
school districts involved been located in such a state, that 
approach would have been correct, although even here it was 
not, to my mind, properly appliedo (I do not want to run 
through equal protection again, but I will say thiso I think, 
l 
in a different setting, that judging a neutral law by its 
~x QUrQose, which I cannot distingyish from motive, is correct. 
I disagree however with the "dorninanc purpose" approach. It 
is impossible to apply because purposes cannot be measured with 
any degree of percisiono I would think the proper rule is that -
if any of the purposes of the law are Xfilx~ex~ racial, than the 
q ~ 
law must withstand a cornpeeling state interest test. But even 
under the dominant purpose approach, I would have reached a 
sixxex different result than the court below did, particularly 
in the Scotland Neck case for the reasons set out in Judge 
Sobeloff•s dissent.) But these school districts were under an 
affirmative duty to dismantle the dual system. And the courts 
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were under a duty to make sure that the x£kaxxxxefe£xeNxxke 
schools came as close as ~assiBl practical to reflecting the 
racial composttion of the £NM community. If the board adopted 
a plan which resulted in less, than, in the words of Green, 
that placed "a heavy burden ~Rxxke upon the board to explain 
its preference for an apparently less effective method." 
This then is the proper test to be applied here. In order 
to justi~y a ~x school plan that offers less xkxRxxke deseg-
regation than the racial composition of the a community, 
the boards must satisfy a heavy burden of justification. 
Having xxNix laid that spadework, I turn to the facts of 
the Scotland Neck case. 
Scotland Neck is a small town R located in Halifax R~MXR 
County, NxS N.C. The school system xkx has xl~x always been 
run on· a county basis by a county board. The racial ~a~lxx~ 
composition of the county is such that in 1968-69 school year, 
77% of the students were black, 22% were white, and 1% were 
Indian. Halifax County maintained a segregated system long 
after xek the Bro~ cases. ~Rl~ In 1965 it switched to a 
freedom of choice system which resulted in a system that was 
still virtually dual. During the 1967-68 term, the four 
traditionally white schools were 97% white and the traditionally 
black schools were 100% black. 
~ 
The scpotland Neck school was 
94% white while the Brawley school, just one mile away, was all 
black. To x maintain this system the county engaged in massive 
bussing via a segregated bus system. 
After the Green decision in 1968, the Justice Dept notif~ed 
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the County that it was not in compliance. A suit was not 
filed however because the County agreed to disestablish the 
dual system. As an interim step in the 1968-69 school year, 
the County agreed to assigne the 7 and 8 grades of the all 
black Brawley to Scbtland Ne« Neck school. Advice was sought 
from th The state recommended 
m plan assigning pupils on the ~axx basis of 
geographic zones, which had not been done a in the past, and 
some pairing. Under this plan) Brawley would have ~KKR had 
330 white pupils and 740 blacks; iER~ Scotland Neck school 
would have had 325 whites and 640 blacks. NI!IWRXIIUt¥XXRRXEI!IMRlqc 
Under this plan, there would have been some white students in 
x every school and there would have been no schools with white 
majorities. But the county refused to implement the interim 
plan or to implement its agreement with Justice. It went back 
to freedom of choice. 
In March, 1969, the state legislature enacted Ch 31 
which was x% a local law providing that a new school district 
b~ cr~ that was contin~ with the boundaries of Scot and 
~· This district stood as a~hole in the donut of the 
' county district. It was the first new d t strict created since 
1954 and it was by far the smallest school district in the 
state, with less than 700 students in all grades. - (The County ~ had about 10,000 students in addition to the Scotland Neck 
students.) The bill had been opposed by the ~x% black 
f of Scotland Neck and by the educationx authorities. was -
clear that the bill was to a substantial, if not dominant 
degree, racially motivated. The focus was on the problem of 
-7- ' . 
whites leaving the school system if forced to attend black 
majority schools. Under this plan, the i~N:G:E: Scotland Neck 
schools would be 57% white and 43% black. Thus, the poeple 
of Scotland Nex Neck had achieved, by means of local legislation, 
their goal of having a maj~y white system. In addition, 
a transfer plan, was devised whereby students in the county 
of Scotland Neck could attend the county schools for free. 
By August, 196~ 350 white and 10 black eounty students xN: had 
applied for transfers to Scotland NeckJ 44 EX black students 
and no white XMX students had applied for transfer to the 
county schools. This meant that the Scotland Neck school 
system would have been 74% white. ~N:exx~xxemxwxxx 
Ch 31 and the accompaniying transfer plan never went into 
effect, however. The district court found xN:xx after a suit by 
the government in which the parents of black students joined, 
that the new law aas, at least in part, racially motivated and 
that it prevented the County from fx:Gm complying with desegregation 
orders. CA 4 reversed, on the xN: dmminant purpose xN:sex theory 
discussed above. It found that in addition to the purpose 
of pandering to the racial prejudices of the wmites in order to 
ek keep them in public schools, that there were two more 
purposes for Ch 31. They found a history of the people of 
Scotland Neck wanting more local control over schools and of 
wanting to increase expenditures for their schools. ( 'I would 
dispute the finding that these were not racial motivations. 
Fpr example, the history of a desire for local control may MX 
-8- ' . 
well have been a reflection of the fact that local control 
meant white control. Also I would questiof he finding that 
raEiax the racial~ purpose was not the dominant one. Having 
lived all my life in place that had de jure segreagation, I 
simply do not fielieve a contrary finding. But more imporatntly, 
in finding thatCh 31, passed by the state legislature, was 
not motivated primarily by problems of race, CA 4 had to 
ignore the transfer system which was Exeax~ clearly des~ed 
for the perpetuation of the dual system--so clearly that CA 4 
ruled it was impermissilbe. CA 4 said that the t~sfer plan 
was a creature of the local board while Ch ix 31 was a cl?ture 
of thex xgeix legislature and that there was no evidence that 
the legislature knew of the transfer plan. Not only is that 
argument the kind of ~~~ien rarely engaged in when 
courts attempt to protect civil rights, but it ignores the fact 
that it is state action not just xegix~axix legislative action 
or school board action that we are concerned with. It takes 
no piercing political% insight to determine that the Kkie white 
majority of Scotland Neck utalized a compliant legislature and 
the school board to ~ex~exMaxxe perpetuate the dual system.) 
Applying the xexxx correct test that I xa«x laid out earlier 
there can be but one result. SEB The County had a duty to 
desegregate its schoolso It had a duty, xx supervised by the 
district court,to approach racial balance if not achieve it. 
Instead, a part of the county split off and formed a white 
enclave where whiee majority schools were maintained. There 
was no compelling reason to do this--the interests in local 
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control and increasing local taxes are hardly compelling 
reasons. Indeed, it was against the fundamental educational 
policy of the state to establish shool systems that were so 
small. I see no way that the law can stand scrutiny. 
Were the racial xxg percentages reversed in this case, 
were Halifax Count 72~ white and had the legislature passed 
a law cutting out the section that had the most blacks from 
the rest of the system, there is no way that this plan could 
stand. I submitx that it is only because the percentages were 
such that it was a white minority segregat~ng itself from a 
black majority that axxsXK the case has come this faro For 
some reason, we think that if the white go xs from an almost 
completely segregated system to a system in which there is a 
substantial black minority that that is sufficient to comply 
with the requirements of equal prot~ction. But such a result 
simply does not comply with this Court's requirements about 
sesegregating. And I submit that the fact that the minority \ 
in this case is white ax« makes no constitutional difference. 
Another roadblock to seeing clearly w~ exactly is 
going on here, is the tendency of CA 4, and the resp•s brief 
in the companion case, to fo~cus on the city of Scotland Neck 
rather than on the county. If we look ?t the city as a l vt ,~'!!;ffJ.I .1-tJ ,.. 't':'!J 
separate entit~, we can say that it ~~from a segreagted 
x~xxxx system xkax to a system that accurately reflects the 
racial composition of the city. But to so focus is to assume 
the conclusion that such a splitting off is constitutional 
The correct focus is on the county school system, including 
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Scotland Neck in the county. fkexexxexxke With that focus, 
we can see that the county went from a virtually dual system 
to a system that k1<has majority white schools and majority 
black schools despmte a county-wide x racial composition that 
is xxxxx~ overwhelmingly black. There is no question that 
viewed from that perspective, the last vestiges of the dual 
system are continued not stomped out. There is no question 
that this is educationally unjustifiable much less compeeled. 
There is no question that CA 4 fell into the trap and must be 
reversed if we are not to see the same pattern repeated xksXN 
xka throughout the South. 
REVERSE Fox 
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State Board recommended Plan, which County refused to accept. 
County went back to "freedom of choice". 
In March 1969, State Legislature enacted Ch. 31 - a local law -
creating a new school district with the boundaries of Scotland Neck. This 
was first new school district since 1954 and the smallest in the State 
( 700 children). 
Result of Bill: 







**As a result of transfers into Scotland Neck from County, the white 
majority would have been 74% by 1969/70. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§u:pumt <!}curt cf Urt 'Jl-1nitcb . .§tcttcn 
:Wanirhtgtcn, 1IJ. <!J. 2LlbfJ!-;t 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: June 2, 1972 
Re: No. 70 - 130)- U.S. v. Scotland Neck Board of Education 
No. 70-187) -cotton v. Scotland Neck Board of Education 
Dear Potter: 
I 
Given that you have a court for the Emporia case, it is likely 
that from the point of view of the Emporia majority Scotland Neck 
is an a fortiorari reversal. I cannot speak for others, but on the 
bas is of the Conference vote it is likely that a brief treatment of 
Scotland Neck could get nine votes. The dissent in Emporia would 
then make points along the line of what I have circulated already 
with a brief treatment of why some of us see differences in the 
two ·cases. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
.:§u.vrcmc <.qltu:rt llf tlrc 'J!ltrH cb ~tttfcg 
J}~t!.'iftinghm. 10. (!f. 2tl&l'1·i 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. June 15, 1972 
RE: Nos. 70-130 & 70-187 - United States 
& Cotton v. Scotland Neck City Board 
of Education. 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
11& 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
1 ' 
CHAMBE:fiS OF 
. . .§tqtttmt <!fou:d l1f tqt 'Jilttitt~ ~tm:ts 
11lrutqmgton. ~. <!J. 2llp'!~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 15, 1972 
'.;. 
Re: Nos. 70-130 and 70-187 - U.S. v. Scotland Neck, etc. 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 






nee.• Jola •· 
111\Cer•l.J• 
B.Jt,W, 
Mr. Jutt1ce stewart 
C I tAI-111 1 ' 0 1 
,JU S TI C C WILL1Aiv1 H. RE HN Q UI S T 
.§ttprmtt Q)'~,ttl't of Hrt ~l1ritrb .§tntr~,. 
2lt1n~•lrinnhm, ;ID. (!)'. 2llpJt:~~ 
June 19, 1972 
Re: 70-130 - U.S. v. Scotland Neck 
70-187 - Cotton v. Scotland Neck 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your opinion concurring in the result 
in this case. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, 
,_(J,n,/ [IV v . 
CHAMBERS 0,. 
jhqn-ftltt CIJ.mrt "' ~, ,.., ....... 
._ .. Jriqtou. J. UJ. tOP# · 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
June 19, 1972 
Re: No. 70-130- U.S. v. ScotlandNeckCity 
Board of Education 
No. 70-187 - Cotton v. Scotland Neck City 
Board of Education 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your opinion concurring 
in the result. 
Sincerely, 
;I{}.. ;:1_ 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
I ' 
Dear Chief: 
June 20, 1972 
Re: No. 70-130 U.S. v. Scotland Neck 
No. 70-187 Cotton v. Scotland Neck 
Please join me in in your opinion cuncurring in the 
result. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief .Justice 
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.To: Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Jus+ice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
.. Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blacbnun 
Mr. Justice Powell Y' 
Yr . Justice Rehnquist 
From: The Chief Ju3tice 
1 6 1972 
No. 70 - 187 -- Cotton v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Education 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the result. 
I agree that the creation of a separate school system in Scotland 
Neck would tend to undermine desegregation efforts in Halifax County, and 
I thus join in the result reached by the Court. However, since I dissented 
from the Court's decision in Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, ante, 
at p. , I feel constrained to set forth briefly the reasons why I dis----· 
tinguish between the two cases. 
First, the operation of a separate school system in Scotland Neck 
would preclude meaningful desegregation in the southeastern portion of 
Halifax County. If Scotland Neck were permitted to operate separate schools, 
more than 2, 200 of the nearly 3, 000 students in this sector would attend 
virtually all-Negro schools located just outside of the corporate limits of 
Scotland Neck. The schools located within Scotland Neck would be pre-
dominantly white. Further shifts could reasonably be anticipated. In a 
very real sense, the children residing in this relatively small area would 
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continue to attend "Negro schools" and "white schools. !I The effect of the 
withdrawal would thus be dramatically different from the effect which could 
be anticipated in Emporia. 
Second, Scotland Neck's action cannot be seen as the fulfillment 
of its destiny as an independent political unit. Scotland Neck had been a part 
of the county-wide school system for many years; special legislation had to 
be pushed through the North Carolina General Assembly to enable Scotland 
Neck to operate its own school system. The movement toward the creation 
of a separate school system in Scotland Neck was prompted solely by the 
likelihood of desegregation in the county, not by any change in the political 
status of the municipality. Scotland Neck was and is a part of Halifax County. 
The city of &poria, by contrast, is totally independent from Greensville 
County; &poria's only ties to the county are contractual, When Emporia 
became a city, a, status derived pursuant to long-standing statutory procedures, 
it took on the legal responsibility of providing for the education of its children 
and was no longer entitled to avail itself of the county school facilities. 
Third, the District Court found, and it is undisputed, that the Scotland 
Neck severance was substantially motivated by the desire to create a pre-
dominantly white system more acceptable to the white parents of Scotland Neck. 
In other words, the new system was designed to minimize the number of Negro 
children attending school with the white children residing in Scotland Neck. 
No similar finding was made by the District Court in Emporia, and the record 
shows that Emporia's decision was not based on the ptojected racial composi-
tion of the proposed new system. 
